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Abstract 
The objective of the paper is to identify the determinants of access to health care in rural Russia.  
We started out with the observation that the transition process has affected the provision of social 
services in the Russian Federation in general, and in rural areas in particular, owing to the 
overlap with agricultural reforms.  Based on this observation we asked how the reduced role of 
the state and the concomitant decentralization of policy making has affected access of the rural 
populace to social services.  A review of the available literature on this topic resulted in the 
formulation of the following three hypotheses.  Firstly, that income is a determinant of access to 
health care.  Secondly, that informal payments play an important role in determining access, and 
thirdly that there are large differences in access to health care services between districts.  The 
hypotheses were tested using household data from a survey conducted in two regions of Russia 
in 2000.  The results indicate that in the study regions, contrary to expectations, neither income 
nor informal payments are important determinants of access.  However, there are large 
differences in out-of-pocket expenditures between districts, indicating that access to health care 
varies between districts.  
Keywords 




In the Russian Federation, one of the erstwhile socialist countries of the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU), hopes were high that democracy and a market economy would bring about rapid 
improvements in living conditions.  The 1990s showed, however, that the shift from a planned to 
a market economy would take much longer than originally anticipated.  Therefore, it is likely 
that the transition process went along with a significant reduction of social services being 
provided free of charge to the Russian population.  The most significant factor in the expected 
reduction of public services available in all regions is likely to be the change of paradigm from a 
largely egalitarian socialist planned economy to a market economy.  
In rural areas of the Russian Federation, however, it is likely that the reduction of social services 
has been particularly severe for various reasons.  The economic downturn has been particularly 
severe and has been associated with the collapse of the former collective farms.  At the end of 
the 90s about 80 percent of the large scale agricultural enterprises were unprofitable.  Prior to the 
collapse of the socialist system these farms effectively constituted focal points for the rural 
communities and were strongly engaged in the provision of various social services.  Health 
services, but also other social services such as maintenance of public infrastructure etc. were 
offered as public goods by these farms, or were at least dependent on these farms.  Furthermore, 
the massive scale of inter-regional redistribution policies applied in the former Soviet Union 
obscured structural weaknesses.  For example, large sections of the population were obliged to 
live in rural regions with few resources (e.g., agriculturally marginal areas) – regions which 
would not have offered a sufficient economic basis for income under market conditions.   
Therefore, it is hypothesized that the wide-spread collapse of the social security system hit such 
population groups all the harder.  
While it is obvious that the provision of social services in rural areas has changed significantly, it 
is unclear how the quality and quantity of social services as well as the institutional and 
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Against this background, the objective of the paper is to provide a case-study of social service 
provision, namely the provision of health care in some rural regions of Russia.  We will ask how 
the reduced role of the state and the concomitant decentralization of policy making has affected 
the access of the rural populace to social services in rural areas.  And, more specifically, what 
institutional arrangements exist today with respect to provision of health care services in rural 
regions of Russia (chapter 2)?  We push the analysis of such institutional changes forward by 
empirically looking into the question which factors determine access to health care of individual 
rural households.  Access to health care will be defined as: a) the likelihood of visiting a health 
care provider and b) in terms of the financial burden, more specifically the out-of-pocket 
payments borne by individuals.  On the basis of a household survey which has been conducted in 
two oblasts (i.e. regions) in the European part of Russia we will test some of our hypotheses 
econometrically with binary logit and tobit models (chapter 3).  Based on the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis, we will then derive some policy conclusions and identify remaining 
knowledge gaps with respect to the provision of social services in rural Russia (chapter 4).  
 
2 Health care in transition: the rural Russian setting 
The central health achievement of the Former Soviet Union was the provision of universal 
coverage and equitable access to health care on the basis of citizenship.  Officially the population 
were guaranteed comprehensive coverage, free at the point of use, and were only asked to pay 
out-pf-pocket for out-patient prescriptions, prostheses and dental care.  In rural areas the first 
point of contact in the health system was the health post, staffed by a feldsher-midwife (WHO, 
1998).  Any problems requiring more complex treatment would be referred to the next level of 
the hierarchy – a rural health centre, polyclinic or the central district hospital.  The health post 
itself would be frequently provided by a rural enterprise, such as a kolkhoz or sovkhoz, rather 
than by the local government.  Even where rural enterprises were not the owners of health care 
facilities they frequently acted as patrons, contributing resources towards the maintenance of the 
facility.   
With transition from a planned to a market economy came changes to the health care system.  
During the early 1990s the highly centralised Soviet health care system gave way to a more 
decentralised model with a reduced role for the state.  The provision of public services in Russia 
is intimately linked to the health of the fiscal system.  Throughout most of the 1990s Russia’s 
public finances have been in varying degrees of crisis. In 1994, the public budget deficit 
culminated and constituted 10.4% of GDP (three times the respective “Masstricht criterion”).  
Nevertheless, Russian reformers wanted to preserve universal access to free health care and even 
increase financing of the health sector.  At the same time the role of market forces was to be 
increased.  Hence, a system of universal compulsory medical insurance was signed into law in 
1993 (Twigg, 1998) with the intention that it should contribute 30% of the total health care 
budget.  While the payroll tax did cover 35% of the health budget by 1997, financing of health 
care in real terms has declined by more than 30% since 1991 (OECD, 2001), see Table 2.1.   
Under the new system regions (oblasts) and districts (raions) own and monitor health care 
institutions, while insurance funds deal with cash flows and insurance companies.  Regions are 
obliged to finance 60% of the health care system and have total control over the regional 
compulsory health insurance funds (WHO, 1998).  However, decentralisation of the health care 
system did not stop with the regions.  The autonomy of districts has increased substantially over 
the last 10 years.  They take on the executive role at the local level, with health care having 
become the de facto responsibility of the districts.  Large variations in the interpretation of the 
role of districts in the health care system have increased regional disparities in health care 
provision, as has the differences in income between regions.  In general, raions lack the 
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raions concentrate their limited funds on urban facilities, neglecting rural areas.  Statistics show a 
drastic decline in public service provision in rural areas since 1992.  This urban bias is one of the 
prime reasons for the continuing role of agricultural enterprises in rural public service provision.  
Traditionally, rural services, whether public or private, were provided by enterprises located in 
rural areas.  Since 1991 many services have been municipalized, but owing to limited financing 
by municipalities health posts, schools, kindergartens etc. still receive support from rural 
enterprises which mostly are agricultural or forestry enterprises.   
Table 2.1 Public expenditure on health care, 1991-1998 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Public expenditure (%  of  GDP)  2.9 2.5 3.7 3.9 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.1 
  Consolidated  budget  2.9 2.5 3.1 3.2 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.4 
 Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund  n/a  n/a  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7 
Public expenditure  (1991=100)          
 Real health expenditure  100  80  108  98  72  71  81  67 
  Consolidated  budget  100  80 91 81 59 57 65 51 
 Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund  -  -  17  17  13  14  16  16 
Source: OECD, 2001:37 
The statuary health care system guarantees access to a comprehensive range of services to the 
entire population at no charge.  Those in work are covered by insurance payments made by their 
employers, while the unemployed, children, students, pensioners and the disabled are covered by 
contributions made by district authorities on their behalf. Voluntary health insurance is available 
for those who wish to secure additional services, but in 1998 less than one per cent of the 
population held private insurance policies (WHO, 1999).  The decline in public funding has 
however, been severe, considerably reducing the ability of the health system to provide high 
quality care to all patients.  To help meet the shortfall in public funding the practice of informal 
patients payments and formal patient charges has expanded according to the OECD (2001).  A 
survey by the University of Boston found that although public expenditure on health care 
declined from its already low position between 1997 and 1998, total health care spending was 
about equal to the OECD average (OECD, 2001).  This was achieved by a substantial increase in 
private expenditure on health care.  Indeed, the ratio of public to private financing of health care 
in Russia is much higher than the OECD average, in December 1998 the Russian ratio was 
almost 1:2 compared to an OECD average ratio of 3:1.  The practice of informal and formal 
patient charges is, moreover, a vehicle whereby patients gained access to medical care.  People 
who could pay received care, those who could not, waited or did not receive care (OECD, 2001).  
Such a development has important implications for access to health care and equality of access.  
If under-the counter payments are widespread and act as a vehicle whereby patients gain access 
to health care, then one can no longer talk about universal access to health care.   
 
3 Empirical analysis of changes in access to health care in rural Russia 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
The modern health care demand analysis is heavily based on the neo-classical paradigm of 
rational consumer and constrained utility maximisation theories.  The basic idea in most of the 
health care demand analyses is that an individual, facing different health care providers, is 
assumed to maximise utility from health (H) and consumption of a composite good (C) subject to 
income and health production function constraints.  This implies that in the event of illness or 
injury, individuals or the household must decide whether to seek medical care and from which 
provider, based on price and non-price factors and the perceived quality of the provider.  Then 
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utility.  If we assume that provider j yields the greatest utility to individual i then the probability 
that the j
th alternative will be chosen (given the individual seeks medical care) is taken as the 
health care demand function for individual i. Diagrammatically, the procedure can be presented 
as shown in Figure 1.  
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Source: after Asfaw (2002). 
The problem can also be presented algebraically as follows.  In a given period, individual i is 
assumed to maximise utility (U), conditional on the consumption of health provided from 
provider j.   
Max: Uij = U(Hij, Cij ) + εij        ( 1 )  
The random error term, εij, captures the notion that efficacy of medical care is not deterministic.  
Utility is maximised subject to the budget constraint and health production function: 
Yi = Pij + pc Cij   (Budget constraint)            (2) 
Hij = H0 + Qj(X,Z)  (Health production function)          (3) 
Where Hij is the post-treatment health status of the individual treated by provider j, Cij is the 
consumption level after choosing provider j.  pc is the price normalised to one for identification 
purpose.  The total income of the individual or household is given by Y, Pij is the price of 
medical treatment from provider j and includes monetary outlay, travel time and waiting time.  
H0 is the initial health status of the individual, and Qj is the improvement thereof, which is a 
function of a vector of individual characteristics (X) that affect health outcome and a vector of 
provider characteristic (Z).   
An individual will maximise the unconditional utility function (U*) given by 
Ui* = Max (Ui1, Ui2, …, Ui J+1)           ( 4 )  
where Uij is the utility function from provider j and j = 1, 2, …, J+1. 
The solution to (4) gives the health care alternative that is chosen.  Note that provider j is chosen 
if and only if Uij > Uik  for all k = 1,…, J+1 , k ≠ j.  The conditional utility function of provider j 
can be calculated by solving for Cj from (2) and substituting (2) and (3) into (1) as follows. 
Uij  = U(H0+ Qij(X, Z), Y – Pij) + εij       ( 5 )  
As long as the conditional utility function, Uij, in (5) is quasi-concave in Hij and Cij, and Hij and 
Cij are greater than zero, a conditional indirect utility function will exist (with properties of 
quasi-convexity, and decreasing prices and increasing income) given by 
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Equation (6) is the reduced form of the indirect utility function of alternative j and it forms the 
bases of estimating health care demand functions in most of the literature. 
Economic studies on the demand for health care confirm that price, both in terms of cash and 
time, is an important determinant.  The factors that have been studied and deemed important are 
travelling time and distance to facility (Acton, 1975; Gertler and van der Gaag, 1990; Hodgkin, 
1996), cash price for health care (Akin et al 1987) and waiting time (Besley et al 1999).  These 
studies suggest that households in both developing and developed countries take decisions to 
seek health care in response to economic constraints such as cash prices and travel time, as well 
as income.  Income appears to be a particularly important constraint in developing countries, 
while travel and waiting time are important determinants in those developed countries that have 
either a national health service (such as the UK) or wide-spread health insurance coverage 
(Germany).  Few studies within the economics literature have explored what determines 
household demand for health care in transition economies.  The increase in formal and informal 
payments discussed in the previous section suggests that ability-to-pay is becoming increasingly 
important in gaining access to health care.  More explicitly the question of interest is whether the 
determinants of demand in transition economies more closely resemble those of developing or 
developed countries. Based on this discussion we postulate the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Income is an important determinant of access to health care services. 
Hypothesis 2: Informal payments are a second important determinant of access to health care 
services. 
Hypothesis 3: There are large differences in access to health care services between districts.  
3.2 The Data 
The study uses data collected in a survey carried out by the Agrarian Institute, Moscow in 
cooperation with [author] in October 2000.  The survey was carried out in two regions of 
European Russia, Oryol and Leningrad.  Rural households located in eight districts were 
surveyed as to their expenditure on health and education, income, economic activity and general 
living conditions.  The health related variables were based on a three month recall period and 
include case of illness, choice of health care provider, amounts paid for consultation and 
pharmaceuticals.  Moreover, the survey recorded the overall sum spent on health care during one 
month, irrespective of whether or not a household member has been ill.  To complement the 
household data the survey included a community component, which provides information on the 
availability of health facilities in the community.   
The sample contains 321 households.  A two-stage sampling procedure was used to select 
households: in the first stage 4 communities were picked in each of the districts in which the 
survey was carried out.  In the second stage household were selected using constant sampling 
fraction to ensure that within each district each household had the same probability of being 
selected.  Households were selected using linear systematic sampling with community registers 
providing the sampling frame.    
3.3 Econometric Analysis  
3.3.1 The Econometric model  
To empirically assess the determinants of demand for health care services a two part model 
(based on that developed as part of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, see Manning et al, 
1987) is used.  The first part analyses the determinants of using health care services, while the 
second analyses determinants of health care expenditure for those who reported use.  A two-
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who did not seek care.  The distribution of health care expenditure is typically not a normal 
distribution, there are many non-spenders who did not use health care in the recall period.   
Furthermore, the distribution is censored owing to a number of users who did not incur any 
expenditure on use.  In Russia, visits to health care providers are ostensibly free of charge and 
thus a proportion of health care users may not incur any out-of-pocket expenditures upon using a 
health care provider.  This problem is solved through the use of a tobit model, while the problem 
of non-users is addressed by restricting the analysis of health care expenditures to those who 
reported use. 
Part one of the model is a binary logit model.  It estimates the probability of an individual 
visiting a health care provider during the recall period.  Formally it can be written as follows:  
Prob (visit>0) = Xß + e        ( 1 )  
Part two is a tobit model that estimates the incurred level of out-of-pocket expenditures 
conditioned on positive use of health care service.  Formally it can be written as:  
Out-of pocket exp/visit>0 = Xγ + µ      (2) 
Where X is a set of individual and household characteristics that are hypothesised to affect 
individual patterns of utilization and expenditure, β and γ vectors of coefficients, e and µ  error 
terms. 
The two-part model is extended through the addition of a third model which estimates the 
determinants of monthly private expenditure on health care.  This third model is added to 
provide insights into private expenditures on health irrespective of whether a household member 
is ill or not.  Households use pharmaceuticals on a preventive basis, or purchase them directly 
without visiting a doctor.  Such expenditures constitute on average 5.3% of the household budget 
(for the sampled households), and factors that influence monthly private expenditures on health 
could differ widely from those that determine expenditure conditional on use.   
The third model has monthly health care expenditure per capita as its dependent variable and can 
be written as follows: 
Health exp per capita>0 = Xγ  + ε        ( 3 )  
3.3.2. Variables included in the analysis 
The main variables of interest in this analysis are income and district level variables such as 
district expenditure on health care per capita and the district dummies.  If formal and informal 
patients charges, as well as pharmaceutical prices, have increased to the extent that access to 
health care is now determined by ability to pay, then income is likely to play a substantial role in 
determining demand.  However, if the socialist system, with universal access, continues to 
prevail then income is not expected to influence expenditure substantially.   
District level variables are of interest owing to the decentralisation of health care to the district 
level.  Overall responsibility for health care is split between municipalities and the Regional 
Health Insurance Funds.  If this decentralisation of health care has resulted in inter-district 
differences in access to health care and the quality of service provided, then it should be reflected 
in the significance of the district variables.  It is anticipated that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood 
of visiting a health care provider is higher and the level of out-of-pocket expenditures lower, in 
districts that spend more on health care per capita.  A second district variable that is included in 
the model is population density.  Population density affects the provision of health care services 
through its affect on the unit cost of provision.  It is anticipated that households in districts with 
high population densities have higher probabilities of visiting a health care provider and face 
lower costs as a result of lower unit costs of provision.  An overview of the variables used in the 
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consumption expenditure data were available as this is the income measure used.  Models one 
and three use the entire data set, while model 2 restricts itself to households that reported a visit 
to a health care provider during the recall period.  The number of observations are 296 in models 
one and three and 159 in model two.  
Table 3.1 Overview of variables used in the analysis  
Variable   Description  Mean  S.D. 
Dependent variables      
VISIT (dummy)  A household member visited a health care provider during the 
recall period (1=yes). 
0.53 (0.5) 
ILLCOST  Out-of-pocket payments incurred during one visit (roubles).  170.97  (538.24) 
Independent variables      
Household and individual characteristics    
AGE  Age of household head  53.5  (15.2) 
EDYEARS  Number of years of education of household head  8.15  (3.22) 
INCOME  Logged monthly household expenditure per capita.  6.731  (0.746) 
SIZE  Total number of adults and children in the household  2.8  (1.39) 
CHILDREN  Number of household members under 18  0.59  (0.88) 
CAR (dummy)  Household owns a car (1=yes)  0.23  (0.42) 
EXEMPT (dummy)  Patient has exemption status (1= yes)  0.089  (0.287) 
HSTATUS  Household expenditure on pharmaceuticals during one 
month recall period 
161.56 (381.01) 
Health care provider      
FAP (dummy)  Patient visits health post (1=yes)  0.15  (0.36) 
RUHOSP (dummy)  Patient visited rural hospital (1=yes)  0.13  (0.33) 
CLINIC (dummy)  Patient visited polyclinic (1=yes)  0.13  (0.33) 
CRH (dummy)  Patient visited district hospital (1=yes)  0.09  (0.29) 
ENT (dummy)  Patient visited enterprise clinic (1=yes)  0.009  (0.096)      
PRIV (dummy)  Patient visited private clinic (1=yes)  0.006  (0.079) 
SPECIAL (dummy)  Patients visited a specialist hospital (1=yes)  0.016  (0.12) 
Community characteristics    
COMPOP  Population of community  2802.12  (2133.98) 
KMHOSP  Distance to nearest hospital  9.41  (8.13) 
District characteristics      
POPDENS  District population density measured in persons per km²  21.360  (9.886) 
RAIMEDPC  District expenditure on health care per capita  250.10  (110.59) 
Standard deviations shown in brackets.  
Economic studies on the demand for health care confirm that price, both in terms of cash and 
time, is an important determinant.  Factors that have been found to be important are travelling 
time and distance to facility (Acton, 1975; Gertler and van der Gaag, 1990; Hodgkin, 1996), cash 
price for health care (Akin et al 1987) and waiting time (Besley et al 1999).  These studies 
suggest that households in both developing and developed countries take decisions to seek health 
care in response to economic constraints such as cash prices and travel time, as well as income.  
Income appears to be a particularly important constraint in developing countries, while travel 
and waiting time are important determinants in those developed countries that have either a 
national health service (such as the UK) or wide-spread health insurance coverage (Germany).   
Other factors that have been found to influence demand for health care include household 
characteristics such as age and education level.  With increasing age, expenditures on medical 
care are expected to rise.  If education increases the efficiency with which gross investments are 
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negative (Grossman, 1972).   
It should be noted that as only 7% of households made informal payments no variable for 
informal payments was included in the analysis.  Instead, informal payments are one of the 
components of the variable ILLCOST, and as such hypothesis 3 cannot be tested independently. 
 3.4 Results and Discussion  
3.4.1 Probability of visiting a health care provider 
The decision of a household member to visit a health care provider is assumed to be influenced 
by individual, household, community and district characteristics.  The most important variable in 
the analysis is income and whether this affects demand for health care.  If health care is a normal 
good then we would expect it to be positively correlated with demand for health care, and hence 
expect households with higher per capita incomes to have a greater likelihood of visiting a health 
care provider.  In this model the analysis is limited to house 
The variables representing individual and household characteristics include age and education 
level of the household head responsible for the household budget, household size, the number of 
children in the household and car ownership as well as a proxy for health status.  Age is 
hypothesised to have a positive effect on likelihood of visiting a health care provider as demand 
for health care increases with age.  More educated household heads are assumed to have a lower 
likelihood of visiting a health care provider.  Both household size and the number of children are 
expected to have a positive effect on visiting a health care provider.  Car ownership is 
hypothesised to increase likelihood of visit as it increases mobility of household members.  To 
control for self-selection bias a health status proxy, household expenditure on medication, is 
included.  It is assumed that a member from a household with poor health status is more likely to 
visit a health care provider than a member of a healthier household.   
At the community level, availability of health care services is expected to influence access.  
Therefore distance to the nearest hospital is included in the regression.  It is anticipated to have a 
negative impact on access.  To control for specific local settings size of the community is 
included in the model.  
Finally, the district in which the household is located affects use of health care services.  It is 
anticipated that households located in districts with higher health care subsidies are more likely 
to use health care services than those in other districts as are households located in districts with 
higher population densities.  The results of the logit regression are shown in table 3.2 below. 
The model is highly significant overall and the pseudo R² value of 0.51 can be considered as 
fairly good for cross-sectional data.  The model shows that income does not have the expected 
significant positive effect, indeed the effect of income is negative!  Such a result indicates that 
use of health care services is not influenced by income.  Moreover, poorer households are more 
likely to visit a health care provider, which may be a reflection of the worse health status of poor 
households compared to rich households.  An important household characteristic in determining 
use of a health care provider is the number of children present in the household.  For every 
additional child the probability of visiting a health care provider increases by 12.4%.   
Whereas household characteristics have a significant influence on using a health care provider, 
characteristics of the household head do not.  In fact it turns out that households with older 
household heads are less likely to visit a health care provider, while education has a positive 
influence on use.  Household size is also negatively correlated with use.  The sample included a 
number of one-person households, upon illness members of smaller households are more likely 
to visit a health care provider as there is no-one to take care of them in the home.   
  9Table 3.2 Marginal coefficients for the determinants of probability of visiting a health care 
provider 
Variable Marginal  Coefficient   
Dependent variable is household member visited a health care provider   
Constant 0.302  (0.447) 
AGE 0.004  (0.003) 
EDYEARS 0.010  (0.011) 
INCOME -0.042  (0.047) 
SIZE -0.042  (0.037) 
CHILDREN 0.124**  (0.058) 
CAR -0.005  (0.084) 
HSTATUS 0.001***  (0.0003) 
COMPOP -0.000  (0.000) 
KMHOSP -0.010**  (0.004) 
RAIMEDPC -0.001**  (0.0003) 
POPDENS -0.006  (0.004) 
Number of observations  296   
Chi
2  47.446  
Significance level  0.000   
Pseudo R
2  0.507  
Log likelihood
  -180.772  
% correctly predicted  67.905   
* Significant at 0.1 level,  ** Significant at 0.05 level,   *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
Standard errors shown in brackets. 
Source: own estimation using LIMDEP. 
As regards community effects distance to the nearest hospital exerts a strong influence on the 
likelihood of visiting a health care provider, being significant at the 5% level.  For every extra 
kilometre the likelihood of visiting a health care provider decreases by 2%.  Ceteris paribus 
every extra kilometre distance to a hospital reduces the probability of visiting any health care 
provider by 1%.  Community size has no influence on the likelihood of use. 
Finally, the level of district subsidy significantly influences use.  District expenditure on health 
care per capita is significant at the 5% level, but contrary to expectations the small coefficient 
has a negative sign.  For every additional 100 roubles per capita spent on health care by the 
district the likelihood of visiting a health care provider decreases by 1%.  One explanation for 
this surprising result is that health status of the population is positively correlated with district 
health subsidy.  Population density has no significant effect on the probability of visiting a health 
care provider. 
3.4.2 Determinants of access to health care 
The main interest of this analysis lies in the importance of income and district variables in 
determining access to health care as measured by out-of-pocket expenditures.  The level of out-
of-pocket payments incurred in visiting health care providers is assumed to be influenced not 
only by the type of health care provider visited but also by district of residence, individual, 
household and community characteristics.   
Household characteristics that are assumed to play a role consist of the household head's age and 
education level as well as household income.  With respect to age of the household head, we 
hypothesise that younger household heads are more willing to pay for health care, but that with 
increasing age the need for making health care expenditures rises, thus the overall effect of age is 
expected to be positive.  Better-educated people are expected to have lower health care 
expenditures.  Income is expected to have a positive effect, households with high per capita 
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more health care.  However, in the vast majority of cases the cost of drugs was the only cost 
incurred in visiting a health care provider, hence the role of income may not be very important.  
In order to control for the fact that some users are entitled to exemptions from pharmaceutical 
charges the dummy variable EXEMPT is included.  As cost of pharmaceuticals is a major 
component of health expenditure EXEMPT is expected to have a negative effect on 
expenditures. 
The level of expenditures incurred on visiting a health care provider is also likely to vary with 
the type of provider.  In the survey seven types of health care provider were included; health 
post, rural hospital, polyclinic, district hospital, enterprise clinic, private clinic and specialist 
clinic.  Visits to a private health care provider will entail higher costs than visits to other 
providers, while visits to enterprise and specialist clinics will involve lower costs as both are 
likely to be better funded then ordinary public health care facilities.  Health posts are used as the 
control group as they represent the universal health care provider and the one most utilised in the 
sample.   
The most important variables in the model, apart from income, are district characteristics.   
Decentralisation of health care to the district level is likely to have an effect on the level of out-
of-pocket expenditures.  In order to capture these district effects a number of district variables 
are included in the model.  The most important of these is the district health care subsidy (health 
spending per district resident), which is expected to have a strong negative effect on the level of 
out-of-pocket expenditures.  Population density is expected to have a negative impact on out-of-
pocket expenditures as districts with high population densities have lower unit costs of provision 
thereby increasing public resources available for paying health care workers’ salaries and 
pharmaceuticals.  To control for specific local settings a number of community characteristics 
are included in the model (community size, distance to district centre).  The results of the tobit 
regression are shown in table 3.3.  The table reports the marginal coefficients of the regressors, 
which were calculated using LIMDEP.  
Of the fourteen variables included in the model four are significant, income once again is not one 
of them.  The fact that income does not have the theoretically expected positive significant effect 
in the two models indicates that income does not play an important role in determining access to 
health care.  It therefore indicates that universal access to health care has indeed been maintained 
in the study regions.   
Of the individual household variables education level of the household head and exemption from 
prescription charges were significant.  Contrary to expectations education does not have a 
negative effect on expenditures.  Every additional year of education increases expenditures by 
nearly 11 roubles, on average.  This may be because the better educated are more aware of the 
need to invest in health status.  EXEMPT is significant at the 10% level, and has the expected 
negative effect.  As prescription charges are the largest component of out-of-pocket expenditures 
it is by no means surprising that individuals with exemption status face lower out-of-pocket 
expenditures, by 145 roubles on average.   
The level of out-of-pocket expenditure appears to be affected by choice of health care provider.  
Of the seven providers included in the model only two are not public: private clinics and 
enterprise clinics.  Unsurprisingly, patients treated in private clinics have much higher 
expenditures than those treated in public clinics, ceteris paribus a patient at a private clinic 
spends 1,895 roubles more than one treated at a public facility.  Given that private clinics only 
provide services on a fee basis, while most services are free at public facilities this is only to be 
expected.  None of the other health care facilities have a significant effect.   
Interestingly district education subsidy is not a significant determinant of health expenditures, 
but population density of the district does have an effect.  POPDENS, as expected, is negatively 
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decreasing expenditures by three roubles.   
Table 3.3 Marginal coefficients for the determinants of out-of-pocket expenditures on health care 
conditional on use 
Variable  Marginal Coefficient  
Dependent variable is out-of-pocket expenditure per visit to a health care provider 
Constant -150.874 (232.821) 
AGE 0.047 (1.475) 
EDYEARS 10.920* (6.246) 
INCOME 34.685 (25.464) 
EXEMPT -145.360** (68.209) 
RUHOSP -48.006 (50.147) 
CLINIC   15.586 (50.256) 
CRH   54.454 (58.335) 
ENT -22.623 (123.981) 
PRIV 1895.802 (178.011) 
SPECIAL -43.071 (90.392) 
COMPOP 0.011 (0.011) 
KMHOSP -2.175 (2.650) 
RAIMEDPC 0.103 (0.198) 
POPDENS -3.611* (2.110) 
Number of observations  104 
Log likelihood
  -668.812 
* Significant at 0.1 level  ** Significant at 0.05 level   *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
Standard errors shown in brackets. 
Source: own estimation using LIMDEP. 
In summary, income does not affect access to health care, as measured by out-of-pocket 
expenditures, while decentralisation has.  Contrary to expectations, it is households in districts 
with high health subsidies that face higher out-of-pocket expenditures.   
3.4.3 Determinants of monthly household expenditures on health care 
The above estimation of access and demand for health care indicate that access to publicly 
provided health care is still universal in the study regions, with income not playing a significant 
role in determining expenditures.  The determinants of expenditure on health are expected to 
differ substantially from the determinants of demand for outpatient and inpatient care, as in this 
case health care is treated as a normal private good.  If health care is a normal good then we 
would expect demand to be positively related to income.  The dependent variable in this model is 
household per capita health related expenditures for a one month period, September 2000 
(HEALTHPC).  Included in HEALTHPC is spending on dental care, opticians, patient fees and 
pharmaceuticals, with spending on pharmaceuticals accounting on average for more than 75% of 
monthly health related expenditures.  It is hypothesised that expenditure on health care is the 
outcome of mainly household characteristics, with community and district variables controlling 
for locational factors.   
In addition to the variables used in the previous section this model includes the number of 
children and number of pensioners present in a household.  Both variables are expected to have a 
positive effect on health spending, as both children and the elderly are more susceptible to 
illness.  Age and education level of the respondent are both expected to have a positive effect, as 
it is anticipated that with increasing age and education level the need for spending on health 
increases.  Income is expected to play a much more significant role as health is treated as a 
normal good, and as such investment in health status should be positively correlated with 
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demand for health care (ILL).   
Of the community and district variables, community size is expected to have a positive sign as 
larger communities offer more opportunities to purchase different types of health care services.  
The effect of distance to hospital and town is ambiguous.  On the one hand the more isolated a 
community is (i.e. the larger distances are) the greater the need to maintain good health, as high 
quality health care services are less accessible increasing monthly expenditures.  On the other, 
isolation reduces the potential opportunities for spending, as only few health care services are 
available, thereby reducing expenditures.  At the district level, RAIMEDPC is anticipated to 
have a positive effect as greater district expenditure should lead to greater access and/or higher 
quality, which in turn increases use and out-of-pocket expenditures.  In contrast urbanisation is 
expected to have a negative effect as the rural populations access to health care services in more 
urbanised districts is worse than in more rural districts.  An overview of the variables used in the 
analysis including their means and standard deviations is given by Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics of variables included in estimating the determinants of 
expenditure on health care 
Variable   Definition  Mean   
Dependent variable    
HEALTHPC  Health expenditure per capita per month  74.726  (107.752) 
Independent variables    
Household characteristics    
AGE  Age of the household head responsible for the household 
budget. 
53.170 (15.290) 
EDYEARS  Number of years of education of the household head 
responsible for the household budget 
8.120 (3.240) 
INCOME  Log of per capita household expenditure per month.  1124.620  (1114.352) 
CHILDREN  Number of household members under 18  0.610  (0.890) 
OAPS  Number of pensioners in the household  0.930  (0.840) 
ILL  Case of illness in recall period, dummy variable (1=yes)  0.580  (0.490) 
Community characteristics     
COMPOP  Population of community  2872.790  (2169.46) 
KMTOWN  Distance to the nearest town  20.812  (14.773) 
KMHOSP  Distance to nearest hospital  9.340  (8.090) 
District characteristics    
URB  Share of district population living in urban areas  36.843  (20.595) 
RAIMEDPC  District expenditure on health care per capita  255.793  (103.364) 
Number of observations:  297   
Standard deviations are given in brackets. 
Source: own calculation using SPSS. 
 
The results of the regression are reported in Table 3.5.  The most striking result of the model is 
the strong significant effect of income on health spending.  Income is significant at the 1% level 
and from the model a one per cent increase in per capita income leads to an increase in 
expenditure of 0.40 roubles.  Thus, health appears to be a normal good.  Of the other household 
variables, OAP is significant but contrary to expectations has a negative sign.  It seems that for 
every additional pensioner in the household monthly per capita expenditure on health care 
decreases on average by 17 roubles.  One possible explanation for this surprising outcome is that 
households with pensioners are more likely to be poor and hence unable to afford to purchase 
non-essential health goods.  Alternatively the negative sign for pensioners could be a reflection 
of the fact that pensioners are more likely to have exemption status reducing their expenditure on 
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member was ill in the previous three months clearly have higher health care expenditures than 
those, which did not report illness. 
Table 3.5 Marginal coefficients of the determinants of expenditure on health care 
Variable Coefficient   
Dependent variable is health expenditure per capita per month   
(Constant) -275.942  (72.757) 
AGE 0.699  (0.492) 
EDYEARS 1.826  (1.698) 
INCOME 40.963***  (6.752) 
CHILDREN -8.583*  (6.599) 
OAPS -17.324**  (7.392) 
ILL 37.830***  (9.669) 
COMPOP 0.003  (0.003) 
KMTOWN 0.669  (0.371) 
KMHOSP 0.241  (0.670) 
RAIMEDPC -0.028  (0.066) 
URB -0.746**  (0.309) 
Number of observations  297   
Log-likelihood function  -1540.883   
* Significant at 0.1 level  ** Significant at 0.05 level   *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
Standard errors shown in brackets. 
Source: own estimation using LIMDEP. 
At the community level only distance to the nearest town is significant at the 10% level.  It is 
positively correlated with health expenditure indicating that the further away from a town a 
household lives, the greater are expenditures for health care.  Every additional kilometre distance 
leads on average to a 0.66 rouble increase in expenditure on health care per capita.  This could be 
an indication of the poorer health status of more isolated rural residents.  Finally, while district 
wealth has no appreciable effect on expenditures, the urbanisation level of the district is 
significant at the 5% level and has the expected negative effect.  A one per cent increase in 
urbanisation leads to a 0.75 rouble reduction in health spending.   
 
4 Conclusions 
We started out with the observation that the transition process has affected the provision of social 
services in the Russian Federation in general and in rural areas in particular, owing to the overlap 
with agricultural reforms.  Based on this observation we asked how the reduced role of the state 
and the concomitant decentralization of policymaking has affected access of the rural populace 
to social services.  A review of the available literature on this topic resulted in the formulation of 
the three hypotheses.  We tested these hypotheses on the grounds of a household survey 
conducted in two districts of Russia in 2000.  Based on the econometric analyses the following 
conclusions can be drawn:  
Hypothesis 1: Income is an important determinant of access to health care services.  • 
Contrary to what we expected, income does not have a significant effect on access to health care 
in the study regions.  The analysis showed that income does not affect the level of out-of-pocket 
payments incurred upon visiting a health care provider.  This indicates that health care is still a 
public good, and that a minimum of social protection is guaranteed.  However, investments in 
the health status of household members seem to be strongly affected by the household’s income.  
  14 Hypothesis 2: Informal – or under-the-counter-payments are another important 
determinant of access to health care services.  
• 
• 
Informal payments do not play an important role in determining access to health care in the study 
regions, with only 7% of the sampled households making such payments.  This might be due to 
the persistence of soviet era institutions and practices in rural areas.  Health care always was free 
of charge and therefore the rural population has not started yet to perceive health services as a 
private good yet. 
Hypothesis 3: There are large differences in access to health care services between 
districts.  
Decentralisation has affected the provision of public goods in rural Russia. However, contrary to 
our expectations out-of-pocket payments are higher in districts with higher public spending on 
health care services. One possible explanation for this might be that there is supply induced 
demand. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that access to public health care for the ill has been 
maintained at relatively high levels in rural areas and that health care continues to be provided as 
a basic need primarily by the state.   
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